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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
any other criminal act connected with the management of a corpora-
tion, may not look to the corporation for recovery of his litigation
expenses.2 0  In a divided court, the majority was of the opinion that
inasmuch as the statute is in derogation of the common law it should
be strictly construed.21 The dissenting judges, in sharp contrast,
contended that compensation for criminal proceedings was within the
intention of the legislators 22 as manifested, among other things, by
the ". . . broad and . . . all-inclusive . . . 23 wording of the statute.
The court, in denying reimbursement, stated that "[i]t would
be a very strange public policy, indeed, which would set up legal
machinery whereby one charged with, or convicted of, a crime, of
whatever kind, could require the corporation . . . to pay his legal
expenses." 24 Where guilt is established, the statement appears to
be correct.
A
CUSTODY - JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT.-In a habeas corpus proceeding to regain custody of
three children, Ohio courts felt bound under the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution I to recognize a Wisconsin decree, rendered
in an ex parte divorce action, granting custody of the children to their
father.2 The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that
full faith and credit need not be given to a custody decree where the
court awarding the decree lacked in personam jurisdiction over the
mother. May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528 (1953).
The purpose of the full faith and credit clause of the Consti-
tution as declared by the United States Supreme Court is that
" . litigation once pursued to judgment shall be as conclusive of
the rights of the parties in every other court as in that where thejudgment was rendered so that a cause of action merged in a judg-
20 In the event of a conviction, the official cannot be held personally liable
to the corporation for losses caused by his acts if it can be shown that he
acted in good faith and with the intention of benefiting the corporation.
Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 270 (Sup.
Ct. 1942), aff'd mern., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 589 (1st Dep't 1944).21 See Matter of Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 305 N. Y. 395,
404-406, 113 N. E. 2d 533, 537-538 (1953) (concurring opinion).
22 Id. at 407-409, 113 N. E. 2d at 538-540 (dissenting opinion).
23 Id. at 407, 113 N. E. 2d at 539.
24 Id. at 402, 113 N. E. 2d at 536 (emphasis added).
1 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U. S. CONST. Art.
IV, § 1.
2 Anderson v. May, 91 Ohio App. 557, 107 N. E. 2d 358, appeal dismissed,
157 Ohio St. 436, 105 N. E. 2d 648 (1952).
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ment in one state is likewise merged in every other." 3 However
commanding this clause may seem, not all judgments of one juris-
diction must be recognized by every other jurisdiction. Thus, where
a decree is issued by a court lacking proper jurisdiction, that decree
is not entitled to full faith and credit.4 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has indicated that full faith and credit need not be given to a
decree of a state where the interests of the second state are para-
mount to those of the decreeing forum.5 These principles have been
recently applied by the Court in formulating the "divisible divorce"
doctrine.6 Under this doctrine, one state need not recognize an
ex parte decree of another state as dissolving all the incidents of mar-
riage, but only as dissolving the vinculum of marriage. 7 The present
case has extended this doctrine to include matters of custody.
As the Court based its decision of the present case solely on the
lack of in personam jurisdiction over one of the parents, it is neces-
sary to determine just what constitutes jurisdiction in custody ac-
tions.8 Many authorities maintain that because a change in status 9
between parent and child is involved, only the state in which the child
is domiciled has jurisdiction; 10 others hold that mere residence of
the child within the state is sufficient. 1 It has also been held that
where a court has in personam jurisdiction over both parents, the
court may adjudicate the custody of the child as between the parties
to the action.12 Where, however, only one parent is before the
court, not of the child's domicile or residence, jurisdiction will not
lie.'8 On the other hand, nowhere can there be found authority to
SMagnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430 (1943).
4Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945); see Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 729 (1877).
5 See Reese and Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judg-
inents, 49 COL. L. REv. 153, 161 (1949).
6Id. at 167.
7 Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541 (1948) ; Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U. S. 555(1948).
8 "A distinction must be sharply drawn between jurisdiction, that is, the
power of a state to create rights that will be recognized abroad, and its power
to act as it pleases within its own territory." 1 B ALx, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 42.2 (1935). Here we are concerned only with the former.
9 Status means a legal personal relationship, not temporary in its nature
nor terminable at the mere will of the parties, with which third persons and
the state are concerned. RESTATEmENT, CoNicr OF LAws § 119 (1934).10 Boardman v. Boardman, 135 Conn. 124, 62 A. 2d 521 (1948); Kruse v.
Kruse, 130 Kan. 946, 96 P. 2d 849 (1939); see 2 BEALE, CoNFicr OF LAws§ 144.3 (1935) ; REsTATMENT, CoNrmcr OF LAws § 117 (1934) ; Goodrich,
Ciestody of Children in Divorce Suits, 7 CORNELL L. Q. 1, 2 (1921).
II Sheehy v. Sheehy, 88 N. H. 223, 186 At. 1 (1936); see Finlay v. Finlay,
240 N. Y. 429, 431, 148 N. E. 624, 625 (1925); see Note, 24 HAmv. L. R~v.
142, 143 (1910).12 Wilson v. Wilson, 66 Nev. 405, 212 P. 2d 1066 (1949); Anderson v.
Anderson, 74 W. Va. 124, 81 S. E. 706 (1914); see Note, 53 HAmv. L. REv.
1024, 1026 (1940).
23Weber v. Redding, 200 Ind. 448, 163 N. E. 269 (1928); Callahan v.
1953)
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support the proposition that both parents need be present where the
child is a domiciliary of the adjudicating forum.
In the instant case, however, where the proceeding was brought
in the child's domicile, the Court decided that both parents must be
present to entitle the decree to full faith and credit. The Court, it
should be noted, does not hold that the decree is void in Wisconsin
as a violation of due process; 14 on the contrary, it infers that it is
valid.' 5 This presents a disturbing situation wherein the father has
legal custody in one state, and the mother may have legal custody in
another. This result is similar to the situation following the decision
of Haddock v. Haddock.6 In that case the Supreme Court held
that the state of the matrimonial domicile was not bound under the
full faith and credit clause to recognize a sister state's valid ex parte
divorce decree if it appeared that the spouse left unjustly. As a
result of that decision a person could be divorced in one state and
married in another, a child could be legitimate in one state and il-
legitimate in another-a situation that contributed to its express over-
ruling in a later case.' 7
While the possible results of the present case do not have the
legal significance of those following the Haddock case,'8 the decision
overlooks the primary consideration of all custody cases, namely, the
welfare of the child.19 The child is made the subject of relitigation
of the same facts and issues, and, more dangerous, he may be
clandestinely removed from one state to another.
The Supreme Court, in its eagerness to protect a mother from
the loss of her children, has apparently made the adjudication of the
parent's right to the child a more important consideration than the
welfare of the child. The better approach to the problem would be
to give the decree binding effect under the full faith and credit clause,
subject always to the parent's right to petition for a change of cus-
tody under the "change of circumstances" rule.20  In such a case,
Callahan,, 296 Ky. 444, 177 S. W. 2d 565 (1944); Steele v. Steele, 152 Miss.
365, 118 So. 721 (1928).
14 "... [Nior shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law. ... ." U. S. CONST. AmSND. XIV, § 1. See
Justice Jackson's dissent in the instant case, 345 U. S. at 536, wherein he
states that only on the ground that due process was violated can the Wisconsin
custody decree be denied full faith and credit. Id. at 537.
15 This inference is supported by the concurring opinion of Justice Frank-
furter. See May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528, 535 (1953) (concurring opinion).
16201 U. S. 562 (1906).
17 See Williams v. North Carolina 317 U. S. 287 (1942).
18 As, for example, property rigAts, inheritance rights, dower, or, more
seriously, possible convictions for bigamy.
19 See, e.g., Green v. Green, 137 Fla. 359, 188 So. 355 (1939); Chadwick
v. Chadwick, 275 Mich. 226, 266 N. W. 331 (1936); Polzin v. Polzin, 54 N. W.
2d 143 (Minn. 1952); Campbell v. Campbell, 245 P. 2d 847 (Mont. 1952).
20 See, e.g., Bowers v. Bowers, 205 Ga. 761, 55 S. E. 2d 152 (1949) ; Burke
v. Burke, 267 Ky. 734, 103 S. W. 2d 291 (1927); Wolz v. Wolz, 110 Mont.
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there would be no relitigation of the same facts and issues and it
would be more in keeping with the stated purpose of the full faith
and credit clause.2 ' More important, the child's welfare would be of
first importance. It is feared that this decision will introduce greater
confusion and uncertainty into the already complicated field of
custody.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - COMMON-LAW MARRIAGES - SUFFI-
CIENCY OF EVIDENCE. - In a proceeding before the Workmen's
Compensation Board, claimant sought benefits as the widow of
decedent-employe, alleging a valid common-law marriage.' In re-
versing the Appellate Division 2 which had affirmed an award, the
court held that a valid common-law marriage was not established
since the probative evidence was insufficient to overcome the pre-
sumption that the relationship, meretricious at inception, continued as
such after the impediment of the claimant's prior subsisting mar-
riage was removed. Matter of Akeson v. Salvage Process Corp., 305
N. Y. 438, 113 N. E. 2d 788 (1953).
The concept of common-law marriage is of ecclesiastical origin.3
Such marriages were recognized in England until Lord Hardwicke's
Act of 1753, at which time they were abolished by the establishment
of statutory regulation of marriage.4 Although this Act did not per-
tain to the American colonies, 5 the majority of states have adopted
its policy and today refuse to recognize common-law marriages con-
tracted within their borders.6 In 1901, New York first prohibited
458, 102 P. 2d 22 (1940) ; Wilcox v. Wilcox, 32 Wash. 2d 633, 203 P. 2d 328
(1949).
21 See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430, 439 (1943).
1 The record showed that claimant married Carl Akeson about 1890 and
left Akeson in 1918 to cohabit meretriciously with the decedent-employe until
his death in 1944. Akeson died on April 17, 1933, thus removing the impedi-
ment to the common-law marriage of his wife and the decedent-employe twelve
days prior to the effective date of the law of 1933, which abolished such
marriages (Laws of N. Y. 1933, c. 606).
2 280 App. Div. 841, 113 N. Y. S. 2d 400 (3d Dep't 1952).
3 See KEzRaz, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 28 (3d ed. 1946).
4 Law of Marriage, 1753, 26 GEo. II, c. 33, repealed by 4 GEo. IV, c. 76
(1823) ; see KEazaR, op. cit. supra note 3; EvFRsL.Y, LAw OF DoMEsTiC RELA-
TIONS 15 (6th ed. 1951).
See DILLON, CoMMoN LAW MARRIAGE 4, 5 (1942).
6 See JACOBS AND GoEBEL, CASES AND OTHER MATmIALS ON DomEsTic
RELATIONS 115 (3d ed. 1952). However, the states do recognize common-law
marriages if they are valid where contracted. See Note, 133 A. L. R. 765
(1941), and cases collected therein.
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